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The History Of The Wars:
1965 war:
1965 Air War
Introduction
The middle of the year 1965 was unquestionably the high point of the PAF's 40-year history. It brought into focus the fundamental character of this small air force when faced, for the first time, with a full scale confrontation with its enemy number one, the Indian Air Force. There had been peripheral skirmishes in earlier years, in widely different contexts, which had given each adversary a glimpse of the other's mettle: the IAF Tempests in 1948 waylaying a defencelsss PAF Dakota, and seeing it escape their cowardly clutches in the hands of a plucky crew determined to go down in flames rather than surrender; the stealthy IAF Canberra in 1959, presuming to exploit the festive relaxation of Eid, and getting ignominiously shot down in the bargain. Aside from the differences in characteristics, as reflected by such incidents, the overriding factor which had become something of an obsession with the PAF, was its adversary's overwhelming numerical superiority. Conservative estimates based on military intelligence put the ratio at 4 to 1. With such a great disparity in numbers, common sense indicated that, despite any discernible qualitative difference, the enemy had a clear upper hand. Since there was no question of trying to redress the quantitative imbalance, the PAF's primary concern, over nearly two decades, was to try to offset it in a variety of ways: with better equipment, better training, better planning, better leadership. As recounted in earlier chapters, efforts in these respects were sporadic during the 'British' phase, and inhibited by British commercial interests, the absence of native leadership at the top, and by an inherited vagueness in matters of war planning and combat training. But the advent of American military aid in the mid-50s, coupled with nationalisation of top PAF leader-ship shortly afterwards, brought about a dramatic transformation by the end of that decade. And when, in 1965, it was eventually pitted against its giant adversary, the PAF found, much to its own triumphant amazement, that it had more than achieved the qualitative edge which it had so ardently sought. The following chapters give an account of the four distinct but interconnected stages of that 1965 sequence: Operation Desert Hawk, Operation Gibraltar, Operation Grand Slam, and the September War
Part I
Opening Round, First Kill
Operation Desert Hawk
The June 65 Plan
Part II
Towards Liberation of Kashmir
Hercules Takes The Lead
Part III
Operation Grand Slam
First Air Combat
Early Reinforcement
A GNAT Surrender
Battle Continues
First PAF casualty
The Fall of Jurian
Part IV
India Invades Pakistan
PAF comes to Pak Army help
GrandTrunk road-graveyard for Indian tanks
Part V
PAF Attack On Indian Air Bases
An Inexcusable Delay
PAF Attacks Pathankot
Adampur Attack
Halwara Attack
My Guns are Jammed
Amritsar Radar and Srinagar
Triumph in the East
The Tail Choppers
B-57s in action
SSG Operations
Do or Die
Part VI
The Battle for Sargodha
The Makinig of an Ace
The IAF Peters Out
President's Message
Part VII
8 September to Cease Fire
Air Superiority Operations
Dog Fight Over Lahore
Sq. Ldr. M.M. ALAM Strikes Again
Close Support
Special Air Support Wing
PAF loses one of its finest pilots
Battle of Chawinda
Munir's Radar
Back on the Air
Two is Hit
Downed by Own Ack Ack
The B - 57 Shuttle
C-130 Heavy Bomber
F-86F Night Fighter
Starfighter F-104 Night Fighter
Ceasefire
Claims and Counter Claims
Acknowledgement
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1971 Air War:
Articles
A Soldier's Diary
Lessons to be learnt
By K.S. Bajwa
Sunday, October 10, 1999
The Battle of Chamb-1971
By Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin
The Battle of Hilli
Columnist Col (Retd) GH NIAZ TI (M)
Battle of Barapind-Jarpal 16 Dec 1971
Columnist Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin
Battle of Dhalai: The Bangladesh Campaign 1971
Defence Journal
The Battle of Khulna, 10-17 Dec. 1971
Brig (Retd) Muhammad Hayat
The Battle of Sylhet Fortress, November - December 1971
Maj. (Retd) Mumtaz Hussain Shah
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Golan War:
'Shahbaz' over Golan
Post-haste summons for volunteers found an eager band of sixteen PAF fighter pilots on their way to the Middle East, in the midst of the 1973 Ramadan war. After a gruelling Peshawar-Karachi-Baghdad flight on a PAF Fokker, they were whisked off to Damascus in a Syrian jet. Upon arrival, half the batch was told to stay back in Syria while the rest were earmarked for Egypt. By the time the PAF batch reached Cairo, Egypt had agreed to a cease-fire; it was therefore decided that they would continue as instructors. But in Syria it was another story.
The batch in Syria was made up of pilots who were already serving there on deputation (except one), but had been repatriated before the war. Now they were back in familiar surroundings as well as familiar aircraft, the venerable MiG-21. They were posted to No 67 squadron, 'Alpha' Detachment (all PAF). Hasty checkouts were immediately followed by serious business of Air Defence Alert scrambles and Combat Air Patrols from the air base at Dumayr.
Syria had not agreed to a ceasefire, since Israeli operations in Golan were continuing at a threatening pace. Israeli Air Force missions included interdiction under top cover, well supported by intense radio jamming as the PAF pilots discovered. The PAF formation using the call-sign "Shahbaz" was formidable in size -- all of eight aircraft. Shahbaz soon came to stand out as one that couldn't be messed with, in part because its tactics were innovative and bold. Survival, however, in a jammed-radio environment was concern number one. As a precaution, the Pakistanis decided to switch to Urdu for fear of being monitored in English. Suspicions were confirmed during one patrol, when healthy Punjabi invectives hurled on radio got them wondering if Mossad had recruited a few Khalsas for the job!
After several months of sporadic activity, it seemed that hostilities were petering out. While the Shahbaz patrols over Lebanon and Syria had diminished in frequency, routine training sorties started to register a rise. Under these conditions it was a surprise when on the afternoon of 26th April 1974, the siren blasted from the air-shafts of the underground bunker. Backgammon boards were pushed aside and the "qehva" session was interrupted as all eight pilots rushed to their MiGs; they were airborne within minutes. From Dumayr to Beirut, then along the Mediterranean coast till Sidon, and a final leg eastwards, skirting Damascus and back to base -- this was the usual patrol, flown at an altitude of 6 km.
The limited fuel of their early model MiG--21F permitted just a 30 minutes sortie; this was almost over when ground radar blurted out on the radio that two bogeys (unidentified aircraft) were approaching from the southerly direction ie Israel. At this stage fuel was low and an engagement was the least preferred option. Presented with a fait accompli, the leader of the formation called a defensive turn into the bogeys. Just then heavy radio jamming started, sounding somewhat similar to the "takka tak" at our meat joints, only more shrill. While the formation was gathering itself after the turn, two Israeli F-4E Phantoms sped past almost head-on, seemingly unwilling to engage. Was it a bait?
Flt Lt Sattar Alvi, now the rear-most in the formation, was still adjusting after the hard turn when he caught sight of two Mirage-III-CJ zooming into them from far below. With no way of warning the formation of the impending disaster, he instinctively decided to handle them alone. Peeling away from his formation, he turned hard into the Mirages so that one of them overshot. Against the other, he did a steep reversal dropping his speed literally to zero. (it takes some guts to let eight tons of metal hang up in unfriendly air!) The result was that within a few seconds the second Mirage filled his gun-sight, the star of David and all. While Sattar worried about having to concentrate for precious seconds in aiming and shooting, the lead Mirage started to turn around to get Sattar. Thinking that help was at hand, the target Mirage decided to accelerate away. A quick-witted Sattar reckoned that a missile shot would be just right for the range his target had opened up to. A pip of a button later, a K13 heat-seeker sped off towards the tail of the escaping Mirage. Sattar recollects that it wasn't as much an Israeli aircraft as a myth that seemed to explode in front of him. (The letter 'J' in Mirage-IIICJ stood for 'Jewish', it may be noted.) He was tempted to watch the flaming metal rain down, but with the other Mirage lurking around and fuel down to a few hundred litres, he decided to exit. Diving down with careless abandon, he allowed a couple of Sonic bangs over Damascus. (word has it that the Presidential Palace wasn't amused). His fuel tanks bone dry, Sattar made it to Dumayr on the vapours that remained.
As the other formation members started to trickle in, the leader, Sqn Ldr Arif Manzoor anxiously called out for Sattar to check if he was safe. All had thought that Sattar, a bit of a maverick that he was, had landed himself in trouble. Shouts of joy went up on the radio, however, when they learnt that he had been busy shooting down a Mirage.
The Syrians were overwhelmed when they learnt that the impunity and daring of the Pakistani pilots had paid off. Sattar was declared a blood brother by the Syrians, for he had shared in shedding the blood of a common enemy, they explained.
Sattar's victim Captain M Lutz of No 5 Air Wing based at Hatzor, ejected out of his disintegrating aircraft. It has been learnt that the Mirages were on a reconnaissance mission, escorted by Phantoms of No 1 Air Wing operating out of Ramat David Air base. The Phantoms were to trap any interceptors while the Mirages carried out the recce. Timely warning by the radar controller (also from the PAF) had turned the tables on the escorts, allowing Sattar to sort out the Mirages.
The dogfight over Golan is testimony to the skills of all PAF pilots, insists Sattar, as he thinks anyone could have got the kill had he been "Shahbaz-8" on that fateful day. Sattar and his leader Sqn Ldr Arif Manzoor, were awarded two of Syria's highest decorations for gallantry, the Wisaam Faris and Wisaam Shuja'at. The government of Pakistan awarded them a Sitara-e-Jur'at each. Sattar, an epitome of a fighter pilot, befittingly went on to command PAF's elite Combat Commanders' School and the premier PAF Base Rafiqui. He retired recently as an Air Commodore.
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Afghan War
A Story of No. 9 Griffin and No. 14 Shaheen Squadron.
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Squadron leader Hamid Qadri from Squadron No. 9
May 17th, 1986
Squadron Leader Badar from Squadron No. 14,
April 16th, 1987
Squadron Leader Athar Bokhari from Squadron No. 14,
April 8th, 1988
Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mahmood from Squadron No. 14,
September 12th, 1988
Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mahmood from Squadron No. 14,
November 3rd, 1988
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Rafiqui Opens the September Account
PAF scored its first victories when Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafiqui and Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti shot down two Vampires each who were attacking Pakistani troops in Chamb.
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B-57 Lost Over Adampur
After a dive bombing attack over Adampur airfield, Flight Lieutenant Altaf's B-57 received a direct hit from Ack Ack guns. The pilot & navigator ejected to become first POWs.
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Pathan Kot Strike
No 19 Squadron lead by Squadron Leader Sajjad Haider executed a text book strike against Pathankot airfield destroying all MiG-21 aircraft on ground.
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F-86 Strike Heavy Guns at Wagah
On 21 September, A formation of eight Sabres from 32 Wing claimed 15 medium & five heavy guns destroyed together with two tanks & a number of other vehicles.
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F-86 Kills Mystere
In a low level chase at tree top height, Flight Lieutenant AH Malik shot down an IAF Mystere, whose pilot Flying Officer Goha was killed in the encounter. The Mysteres were exiting at such a low height that the F-86s in pusuit were practically touching the tree tops. The entire bottom of No 2's aircraft was geen when it landed back at Sargodha.
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